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STUDENT NOTES
know and understand the business in which he is engaged-that it is
in making a will", is approved. While some courts require testator
to remember property or beneficiaries only in a general way, or rea-
sonable manner," others would seem to require testator to remember
details as to his property or beneficiaries," or to comprehend perfectly
conditions of his property, his relation to objects of his bounty, and
scope of his 'will," that he must be capable of comprehending all the
conditions which affect the act in which he is engaged. 4 It is said that
testator must have sufficiently active memory to collect in his mind,
without prompting, elements of business to be transacteds and hold
them in his mind long enough, at least, to perceive their obvious rela-
tions to each other" and be able to form some rational judgment in
relation to them." Nothwithstanding this variation among the courts
in emphasizing the different requisites for testamentary capacity and
the tendency of some to raise the standard above the general rule,
it is to be noted that by far the greater number of courts in recent
cases have tended to use the simpler statement of the standard for
capacity to make a valid will or testament. It might be repeated here
that no exact measure can be set, that it is a matter of degree which
is to be determined in the particular case at hand from the circum-
stances of the case. "In whatever form the standard is stated, greater
capacity is not necessary; less is sufficient; and in each case it is a
question of fact, or of mixed law and fact, whether the testator possesses
the requisite capacity."5'
PALMFr L. HArs.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE-IS IT SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE IN
HOMICIDE CASES?
In a recent New York case, the proximate cause of the death of
a pedestrian was defective brakes on a truck; the owner of the truck
was held guilty of manslaughter though he was not an occupant of the
truck at the time of the accident. This is another example of the
increasing inclination of the courts to place emphasis upon societal
harm rather than upon the evil intent and blameworthy mental attri-
"Ellis v. Britt, 181 Ga. 442, 182 S. E. 596 (1936); Niemes v.
Nlemes, 97 Oh. St. 145, 119 N. E. 503 (1917); In re Nitey's Estate,
175 Okla. 389, 53 P. (2d) 215 (1936).
"In re Combs, 118 N. J. Eq. 119, 177 Atl, 849 (1935).
"In re Ross' Will, 182 N. C. 477, 109 S. E. 365 (1921).
"In re Salomon's Estate, 287 N. Y. S. 814, 159 Misc. 379 (1936).
*'Ramseyer v. Dennis, 187 Ind. 420, 119 N. E. 716 (1918).
4In re Salomon's Estate, 287 N. Y. S. 814, 159 Misc. 379 (1936).
,*Appeal of Martin, 133 Me. 422, 179 AtI. 655 (1935).
'*In re Salomon's Estate, 287 N. Y. S. 814, 159 Misc. 379 (1936).
'a I Page on Wills, Sec. 141.
'People v. Rauch and Washington, New York Times, Feb. 10, 1937;
see note (1937) 46 Yale Law Journal 141L
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butes of the individual.2 Such inclination raises the question: Can
the subjective or mental phenomena in criminal negligence be disre-
garded and the objective quality of the conduct alone be construed as
the criterion?
3
"Before the law can punish the act an inquiry must be made Into
the mental attitude of the doer."' The principal case would tend to
indicate that the courts are departing from this concept, i. e., that
some type of mens rea is a necessary element in the imposition of
criminal liability, at least in so far as criminal negligence is concerned.
But the problem will bear consideration from the standpoint of the
fundamental purposes of criminal liability.
Though some authorities cling to the ancient retributive theory of
criminal punishment as a substantial factor to be considered," it Is
more often conceded that the primary purpose of criminal punishment
is the realization of some future good.6 This utilitarian justification Is
achieved through the application of three component factors: The
preventive theory, the reformatory and educative theory, and the
deterrent theory.' Will a purely objective outlook toward criminal
negligence satisfy this utilitarian idea?
A good quality of mind, that is, a normal regard for the safety and
welfare of society, will generally prevent an individual from commit-
ting dangerous acts.8 Yet, regardless of that mental excellence, that
individual may at some time commit acts which will be considered
abnormally dangerous.9 In the principal case, it was undeniably
dangerous conduct on the part of the owner to allow another to drive
his truck which had defective brakes. But it is conceivable that the
owner had a normal regard for the safety of society regardless of that
2 Bigelow, Torts (8th ed., 1907), p. 19. Bigelow suggests a similar
trend in civil law.
3 Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence and Indifference (1926)
39 Harvard Law Review 849 (possibilities of the objective theory in
connection with civil liability).
4 "There are two conditions to be fulfilled before penal responsi-
bility can rightly be imposed. One is the doing of some act by the
person to be held liable. * * * The other is the mens rea or guilty mind
with which the act is done." Salmond, Jurisprudence (3rd ed., 1910),
s. 127.
'Holmes, The Common Law (1881), p. 41.
6Willoughby, Social Justice (1900), pp. 322-380; Holmes, The
Common Law (1881), pp. 42-44; Salmond, Jurisprudence (7th ed.,
1924), ss. 28-31; Clark, Clark's Criminal Law (3rd ed., 1915), p. 4;
Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code (1928), 41 Harvard Law
Review 453, 455.
7 Supra note 6.
8 Edgerton, supra note 3, at 865. "To say that an act is negligent
is to say that it would not have been done by the possessor of a nor-
mal mind functioning normally." Terry, Negligence (1915), 29 Harv.
L. R. 40, 41.
*"'Just as a man can do right though his state of mind is blame-
worthy so he can do wrong though his state of mind is not blame-
worthy." Terry, Negligence (1915), 29 Harvard Law Review 40, 41.
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single dangerous act. It is probable that the owner, having such
normal regard, would not have been guilty of dangerous conduct
again.2 Continuing with our supposition, by applying the objective
theory to such circumstances, an individual may be held liable for
dangerous conduct though he has a quality of mind which is above
reproach, and though there Is little or no probability that he will be
guilty of dangerous conduct in the future.
This conclusion is inconsistent with the utilitarian justification
of criminal punishment. From the standpoint of the preventive theory,
which is based solely upon the probability that similar injuries will
be instigated by the same offender n certainly such punishment could
not be justified. And from the standpoint of the reformatory and edu-
cative theory, committing one to punishment for the purpose of
teaching him that he should not commit such acts2 would seem
ridiculous when it is an admitted fact that, without such training, that
individual probably will not be instrumental in committing that or
other dangerous acts again. Not only would this inflict injustices upon
the Individual, in being imprisoned and punished for the purpose of
teaching him that which he already knows by virtue of the excellence
of his regard for the welfare of society, but also injustice would be
inflicted upon the community in being deprived of such individual's
services, allegedly for its protection from that individual, but admit-
tedly where protection from that individual is utterly unnecessary.
The remaining factor of the utilitarian justification, i. e., the
deterrent theory, when viewed from its subjective effect might also
be construed as inconsistent with the imposition of criminal liability
under such circumstances. Would-be law breakers are suiposedly dis-
suaded from the commission of such acts when the offender is sub-
Jected to punishment;" he is persuaded or encouraged to attain a
degree of mental excellence by such punishment. But if the potential
criminal should realize that regardless of the achievement of that
degree of mental excellence he may nevertheless be held liable crim-
Inally, it seems apparent that he would not be encouraged to attain a
degree of mental excellence. Furthermore, individuals who have striven
to acquire or retain that mental attribute might realize the futility of
their efforts and relax their vigil. Thus the imposition of criminal
10"The mental excellence may prevent him (the offender) from
causing harm another time, but it did not prevent him this time, from
causing harm by dangerous conduct." Edgerton, supra note 3, at 865.
Professor Edgerton urges that regardless of the little likelihood of sim-
ilar injury occurring again at the hands of that offender, he should
nevertheless be held civilly liable. "Negligent conduct may be due to a
mere error in judgment, where the actor gives due consideration to
the possible consequences, and mistakenly makes up his mind that the
conduct does not involve any unreasonably great risk. He is not
therefore excused if his conduct is in fact unreasonably dangerous."
Terry, supra note 9, at 44.
-Sayre, Cases on Criminal Law (1927), p. 12.
SIbid.
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liability under such circumstances might actually discourage the
acquisition or retention of a quality of mind tending to prevent the
commission of dangerous acts.
In many cases we cannot distinguish between the intentional and
the negligent wrongdoing, save by looking into the mind of the offender
and observing his subjective attitude towards his act and its conse-
quences.14 A father allows his infant daughter to die from a disease
which in all probability could have been cured by proper medical atten-
tion which could have been obtained without great hardship." A
woman places a poisonous drug in a place where children would be
likely to discover it, and the deceased infant ate it and died of its
effects."9 Whether the consequences were truly intended or were the
result of a high degree of negligence cannot be determined without
contemplating the mental attitude of the offenders. "Negligence is the
opposite of wrongful intention, and since the latter is a subjective fact
the former must be such alsoY
In Banks v. State, s it was the quality of mind of the prisoner
which was primarily instrumental in securing a conviction of murder
rather than manslaughter. The court referred to this conduct as
"evincing a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mis-
chief". The prisoner had fired his revolver at a moving freight train,
killing a negro brakeman; his previous conduct indicated that he not
only realized the danger involved, but displayed an attitude of utter
indifference to the consequences of his act. By looking at the quality
of the conduct alone, a distinction between murder and manslaughter
in such cases would be difficult to define. Whereas an abnormally
dangerous quality of conduct produced and accompanied by a blame-
worthy quality of mind would supply the requisite implied malice
prepense of second degree murder, the abnormally dangerous quality
of the conduct alone and unaccompanied by a blameworthy quality
of mind would be insufficient to raise the presumption of malice and
insufficient to support a conviction of murder.? Thus, in so far as a
distinction between manslaughter and murder is concerned, the sub-
jective elements must be a primary consideration in criminal
negligence.
In conclusion and by way of summary, it is suggested that the
application of the objective theory alone to the quality of the conduct
in criminal negligence is inconsistent with our conception of the pur-
poses of criminal punishment, and would tend to Inflict gross injustice
upon the individual and upon society by punishing the individual who
'14 Salmond, Jurisprudence (7th ed., 1924), p. 422.
=IbMd.
"Id., at 421.
17 I., at 422.
185 Tex. Crim. Rep. 165, 211 S. W. 217 (1919).
" , anslaughter * * * is principally distinguishable from murder
in (that) * * * the malice either express or implied, which is the very
essence of murder, is presumed to be wanting in manslaughter." East,
Pleas of the Crown (Vol. I., 1803), 218.
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Is no more likely to promote dangerous conduct again than is any
ordinarily prudent and mentally alert individual. Without observing
the subjective attitude of the offender towards his act and its conse-
quences, a distinction cannot be made between the intentional and the
negligent wrongdoing, making it equally as difficult to distinguish
between conduct justifying a conviction of murder and that justifying
a conviction of manslaughter. It is submitted that regardless of the
increasing inclination of the courts to place emphasis upon societal
harm rather than upon the subjective attitude of the offender, the
subjective attitude must continue to play an important role in the
formulation of a deflntion of criminal negligence.
3T. Wiar TUnRus, Ti.
THE CONTROL OF INFERIOR JURISDICTIONS BY THE KEN-
TUCKY COURT OF APPEALS
The superintending control over inferior tribunals possessed by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals is of ancient inception, and relates
back to and has its origin in the power exercised by the King's Bench
in England. It has been said that the exercise of this supervisory
power is recognized by the common law, apart from constitutional and
statutory provisions. However, in most of the recent cases which have
discussed the power eo nomine, its existence has been based on a con-
stitutional or statutory grant.
Thus, we find the Kentucky Court of Appeals receiving its power
by a constitutional grant which states, "The Court of Appeals shall
have power to issue such writs as may be necessary to give it a general
control of inferior jurisdictions."2
The writs which have been used by the court have been those of
mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The use of the writ of prohibi-
tion greatly predominates.3 It would seem that the writ of mandamus
could not be granted in Kentucky, since the code states that the writ
of mandamus shall be granted by courts having original jurisdiction
and the Court of Appeals is one of appellate jurisdiction. However,
the court has stated in effect, that whenever the necessity for such
writ shall arise, the jurisdiction to grant it shall be theirs, as it was
before the adoption of the Civil Code.'
From time to time controversies have arisen as to whether the
Court of Appeals has such supervisory power and jurisdiction over
1 Arnold v. Shields, 5 Dana. 18, 30 Am. Dee. 669 (Ky. 1837).
2Kentucky Constitution, Section 110 (1892).
$Rush v. Denhart, 138 Ky. 238, 127 S. W. 785 (1910); Patterson
v. Davis, 152 Ky. 530, 153 S. W. 780 (1913); Ohio River Contract Co. v.
Gordon, 170 Ky. 412, 186 S. W. 178 (1916); Smith v. Ward, 256 Ky. 213,
75 S. W. (2d) 538 (1934).
'Vance v. Field, 89 Ky. 178; 12 S. W. 190 (1889).
